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COMMENTS 
The Effect of Guardianship on Estate Plans 
One responds to the certainty of death with dread and respect, 
and one lays plans for the event. Few, however, admit or even think 
of the possibility that they may become incompetent in their old 
age; hence, provision is rarely made for this possibility in estate 
plans.1 The increased longevity resulting from the recent rapid 
strides in medicine has as its corollary an increase both in the num-
ber of persons who become incompetent before death and the dura-
tion of their affliction. This poses a challenge to estate planners and 
the law of guardianship. 
When provision has not been made in an estate plan, a court 
appointed guardian fills the need for some responsible person to care 
for the incompetent's person and property.2 If such a guardian is 
appointed as a guardian of the person, his duty is to attend to the 
personal needs of the incompetent and prevent him from physically 
harming himself and others.3 If he is appointed as a guardian of the 
estate, on the other hand, his task is to manage the incompetent's 
financial affairs. Although these two functions may be discharged 
by the same person, it may be desirable that a different person un-
dertake each responsibility. When an aged incompetent is no longer 
able to care for himself, a relative may be the best person to look 
after the incompetent's personal needs, but poorly equipped to man-
age the incompetent's financial affairs. A separate guardianship of 
the estate by a person of good business judgment and fiduciary ex-
perience may therefore be desirable. 
Today the guardianship of the person of an incompetent does 
not present the law with many new problems; this comment, there-
fore, will be concerned exclusively with the problems associated with 
the guardianship of an incompetent's estate. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A concern for safeguarding minors early impressed itself on the 
development of the American law of guardianship,4 and this orien-
tation survives to this day. Since minors do not ordinarily have estate 
I. See Zillgitt, Planning for Incompetency, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 181 (1964); Note, 
Guardianship in the Planned Estate, 45 IowA L. REv. 360 (1960). 
2. The leading authority in the area of guardianship is WOERNER, THE AMERICAN 
LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP (1897) [hereinafter cited as WOERNER]. For more recent writings 
see Fratcher, Toward Uniform Guardianship Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 983 (1966); 
Symposium on Guardianship, 45 IowA L. R.Ev. 209 (1960). 
3. See WOERNER §§ 47-52, 137-39; Fraser, Guardianship of the Person, 45 IowA L. 
REV. 239 (1960). 
4. See Fratcher, supra note 2, at 984. 
[ 1613] 
1614 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:1613 
plans, it is not surprising that the law of guardianship does not speak 
to the effect of guardianship on estate plans. This factor, plus the 
very limited scope of preservative activities which present law allows 
the guardian to pursue, renders the law of guardianship distinctly 
unsuitable as applied to the aged incompetent, who may often have 
an estate plan worked out to a fineness of detail rivaling the old En-
glish family property settlements. Increasingly, guardians find them-
selves faced with a conflict between effectively managing their ward's 
estate, on the one hand, and respecting the plans that their wards 
have made for disposing of their wealth, on the other. 
American law assigns to the guardian a role of very limited scope. 
His duties are largely the conservation of his ward's estate, the pro-
duction of income from that estate, and the application of that in-
come to his ward's needs.5 Certain powers of a guardian, and of the 
court supervising him, are fairly clear. The guardian, acting without 
special court direction, may collect debts owed to his ward,6 contract 
for the ward's necessities (with a right of reimbursement from his 
ward's estate),7 make short-term leases of real estate,8 and sell per-
5. See id. at 984-85. 
6. Cox v. Williams, 241 Ala. 427, 3 So. 2d 129 (1941); Grant v. National Sur. Co., 
7 Alaska 179 (1924); ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 14-809 (1956); Suggs v. Valentine, 204 Ark. 
86, 160 S.W.2d 890 (1942); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-627 (Supp. 1957); CAL. PRon. CoDlc: 
§§ 1501, 1530a; Cole v. Jerman, 77 Conn. 374, 59 Atl. 425 (1904); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 3921 (1953); First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1939); Carlton 
v. Morgan, 68 Fla. 535, 67 So. 79 (1914); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1505 (1937); HAWAII REV. 
LAws § 338-24 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-1820 (1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 276, 
293 (1963); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 5 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8.139 (1953); Jensen v. 
Martinsen, 228 Iowa 307, 291 N.W. 422 (1940); IOWA CODE § 668.9 (1962); KAN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-1804 (1964); KY. REv. STAT. § 387.130 (1962); Stockman v. City of So. 
Portland, 147 Me. 376, 87 A.2d 679 (1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3 (1965); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 3505 (1965); Hamill v. Hamill, 162 Md. 159, 159 Atl. 247 
(1932); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201, § 37 (1955); Reason v. Jones, 119 Mich. 672, 
78 N.W. 899 (1899); MICH. Co'MP. LAws § 703.18 (1948); Patterson v. Melchoir, 102 
Minn. 363, 113 N.W. 902 (1907); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.56 (Supp. 1966); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 440 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 475.130, 507.110 (1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 
§ 91-4902 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-502 (1943); NEV. REv. STAT. § 159.270 (1963); 
N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 462:4, :28 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-17 (1953); In the 
Matter of Hynes, 105 N.Y. 560, 12 N.E. 60 (1887); Coggins v. Flythe, 113 N.C. 102, 
18 S.E. 96 (1893); N.C. GEN: STAT. §§ 1-64, 33-20, -28 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 30-14-06 (1943); Row v. Row, 53 Ohio 249, 41 N.E. 239 (1895); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2111.14 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 804 (1961); Murphy v. Whetstone, 
96 Ore. 293, 188 Pac. 191 (1920); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1041 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 50, § 3401 (Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE § 35.2001 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-402 
(1955); TEX. PRon. CODE ANN. §§ 230(b), 233 (1956); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1981 
(1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-13-35 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2693, 2799 (1958); 
Garland v. Norfolk Nat'l Bank, 156 Va. 653, 158 S.E. 888 (1931); VA. CODE ANN. § 37-
147 (1950); WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 11.92.060 (Supp. 1956); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 319.23 (1957). 
7. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1502; In the Matter of Estate of Schluter, 209 Cal. 286, 
286 Pac. 1008 (1930); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-301 (1961); Williams v. Vaughan, 363 Mo. 
639, 253 S.W.2d 111 (1952); In the Matter of Vieweger, 93 N.J. Eq. 527, 117 Atl. 291 
(Ch. 1922); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:18-3, :20-8 (1951); McCormick v. Shannon, 127 App. 
Div. 745, Ill N.Y. Supp. 875 (1908); In the Matter of Roosevelt, 131 Misc. 800, 228 
N.Y. Supp. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1928). 
8. Cole v. Jerman, 77 Conn. 374, 59 Atl. 425 (1904); Kinney v. Harrett, 46 Mich. 87, 
8 N.W. 708 (1881); Martin v. Smith, 214 Minn. 9, 7 N.W.2d 481 (1942); N.J. REV, STAT, 
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sonal property when necessary to meet the ward's expenses.9 Outside 
of these activities the guardian must apply to the supervising court 
for authority to act. It is well settled that the guardian may not sell, 
exchange, or mortgage real property without prior court approval.10 
As to other transactions, a rule frequently advanced to distinguish 
between what a guardian may and may not do without court ap-
proval is expressed in terms of whether the guardian must make an 
"election":11 When the guardian must elect benveen clearly conflict-
ing alternatives, he must seek court direction before making the deci-
sion.12 A guardian faces such an election, for example, when he must 
decide whether his ward, a widow, should assert her dower rights to 
her deceased husband's property, or take under his will. In practice, 
however, it may often be difficult to decide what constitutes an elec-
tion and what is simply a claim of right belonging to the ward. 
The guardian's powers of investment, either with or without 
court approval, are generally much more restricted than those of the 
trustee,13 even though the guardian is under a duty to produce in-
come from his ward's estate.14 Moreover, unlike a trustee or personal 
representative, the guardian does not hold legal title to his ward's 
property; consequently, a bona fide purchaser of property from a 
guardian receives no legal title unless the guardian had lawful au-
§ 3A:16-l (1951); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 106(1); OHIO R.Ev. CODE § 2111.25 (Page 
1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1062 (1950). 
9. Cookson v. Louis Marx &: Co., 23 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); FLA. STAT. § 745.05 
(1965); Hempstead v. Broad, 275 Ill. 358, 114 N.E. 120 (1916); Fletcher Trust Co. v. 
Hines, 211 Ind. Ill, 4 N.E.2d 562 (1936); MICH COMP. LAws § 709.1 (1948); N.J. R.Ev. 
STAT. § 3A:15-14 (1951); In re Collard, 8 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1948); OHIO REv. CoDE 
ANN. § 2111.20 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1061 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 50, § 3441 (Supp. 1958). 
10. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1530; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-238 (1960); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 49-204 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 378 (Smith-Hurd Supp., 1966); MICH. 
COMP. LAws § 709.3 (1948); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 106. 
11. Where an incompetent has a personal privilege to elect between alternative 
and inconsistent rights or claims, it has been held that the privilege does not pass 
to the committee of the property of the incompetent. • • • A court of equity, 
through its general jurisdiction over fiduciaries and its function of guardianship 
of incompetents, may, in the proper case, direct the committee to act in behalf of 
the incompetent •••• 
In the Matter of Hills, 264 N.Y. 349, 353, 191 N.E. 12, 13 (1934); accord, Matter of 
Brown, 212 App. Div. 677, 209 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1925). 
12. Camardella v. Schwartz, 126 App. Div. 334, 110 N.Y. Supp. 611 (1908). See also 
Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Dais, 122 N.J. Eq. 182, 192 Atl. 849 (1937). 
13. See Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. R.Ev. 
264, 268-91 (1960). 
14. ALA. CODE tit. 21, § 42 (1958); D.C. PROB. CT. R. 28, § 5, FLA. STAT. § 745.03 
(1957); Hogshead v. State. 120 Ind. 327, 22 N.E. 330 (1889); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-134 
(1953); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 192 (1957); MICH. COMP. LAws § 709.l (1948); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 525.56 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.190 (Supp. 1958); N.J. R.Ev. 
STAT. § 3A:15-16 (1951); In the Matter of Staten Island Nat'! Bank &: Trust Co., 156 
Misc. 330, 282 N.Y. Supp. 163 (Surr. Ct. 135); N.Y. Do111. REL. I.Aw § 85; Armstrong v. 
Miller, 6 Ohio 118 (1833). 
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thority to sell the property.15 Furthermore, there are certain transac-
tions which a guardian may not undertake even with court approval. 
He may not, for example, lease his ward's real property if the lease 
will run beyond the period of the guardianship.16 This rule was de-
veloped for the guardianship of minors, where the duration of the 
guardianship is readily ascertainable, usually ending when the ward 
reaches legal majority.17 In the case of the guardianship of incompe-
tents, however, this rule makes anything but a short-term lease im-
possible. 
The rule concerning leases is really a special application of the 
broader rule that a guardian may not make contracts, except for ne-
cessities, which are binding on the ward.18 A guardian's contract may 
be enforced against the guardian but not against the ward himself, 
unless the ward affirms the contract after becoming competent.19 
Moreover, a person who advances credit to the guardian for the 
ward's benefit may not recover his debt from the ward's estate, un-
less he has first exhausted the personal resources of the guardian.20 
This inability of a guardian to contract makes it nearly impossible 
for him to conduct an existing business of his ward's. Furthermore, 
in most states the supervision of guardians is vested in a court of 
limited jurisdiction;21 therefore, even when the guardian is acting 
under a specific court directive, it is not always certain that the court 
possesses the authority to authorize a particular transaction. The 
practical result is that persons are wary of dealing with a guardian 
in any matter, making it very difficult for the guardian to discharge 
the duties of his office. 
15. WOERNER § 53, at 173 n.2 and accompanying text; Fratcher, Powers and Duties 
of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REv. 264, 291-92 (1960). 
16. See note 8 supra. 
17. WOERNER § 61. 
18. See cases cited in note 7 supra. 
19. Guardianship of Cookingham, 45 Cal. 2d 367, 289 P.2d 16 (1955); Fay Improve-
ment Co. v. DeBudge, 52 Cal. App. 695, 199 Pac. 819 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921); Rountree 
v. Simmons, 56 Ga. App. 678, 193 S.E. 787 (1937); Greever v. Barker, 316 Mo. 308, 289 
S.W. 586 (1926); Rhodes v. Frazier's Estate, 204 S.W. 547 (Mo. App. 1918); Coxe v. 
Whitmire Motor Sales Co., 190 N.C. 838, 130 S.E. 841 (1925); Shepard v. Hanson, 9 N.D. 
249, 83 N.W. 20 (1900); Sturgis v. Sturgis, 51 Ore. IO, 93 Pac. 696 (1908); Storey v. 
Lonabaugh, 247 Pa. 331, 93 Atl. 481 (1915); Miller v. Vervena, 69 R.I. 285, 33 A.2d 
178 (1943); Richards v. McAtee, 87 W. Va. 469, 105 S.E. 692 (1921); Melcher Lumber 
Co. v. Gunderson, 192 Wis. 571, 213 N.W. 300 (1927). 
20. Tasker v. Cochrane, 94 Cal. App. 361, 271 Pac. 503 (3d Dist. 1928); Fay Im• 
provement Co. v. DeBudge, 52 Cal. App. 695, 199 Pac. 819 (1921); Daird v. Steadman, 
39 Fla. 40, 21 So. 572 (1897); Rountree v. Simmons, 56 Ga. App. 678, 193 S.E. 787 
(1937); Lothrop v. Duffield, 134 Mich. 485, 96 N.W. 577 (1903); Rhodes v. Frazier's 
Estate, 204 S.W. 547 (Mo. App. 1918); Coxe v. Whitmore Motor Sales Co., 190 N.C. 838, 
130 S.E. 841 (1925); Shepard v. Hanson, 9 N.D. 249, 83 N.W. 20 (1900); Sturgis v. 
Sturgis, 51 Ore. 10, 93 Pac. 696 (1908); Miller v. Vervena, 69 R.I. 285, 33 A.2d 178 
(1943); Andruss v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 63 Pac. 888 (1901). 
21. See Simes &: Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America: II, 43 
MICH. L. REv. 113 (1944). 
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II. GUARDIAN'S EFFEGr ON ESTATE PLANS 
Given this general background, it is the purpose of this comment 
to explore the following questions: 
(I) To what extent and under what circumstances may a guar-
dian, with or without court approval, carry out or disturb the 
plans expressed in his ward's will? 
(2) To what extent and under what circumstances may he exer-
cise the power reserved by a settlor, who has since become in-
competent, to revoke, amend, or invade the corpus of a trust? 
(3) To what extent and under what circumstances may he sur-
render for cash, change the beneficiary of, or alter the terms 
of a life insurance policy? 
Unfortunately, in most of the situations to be examined in this 
comment, statutory treatment is lacking, and the case law is insuffi-
cient to give a clear answer to these questions. However, some obser-
vations and predictions are possible. 
A. Wills 
A will, usually the most important part of an estate plan, does 
not become effective until the testator's death, and its existence may 
be unknown to a guardian during the testator's life. Very often such 
ignorap.ce on the part of the guardian will matter to no one, since 
the role of the guardian is to act as a conservator of his ward's estate, 
and purely conservative activity will generally have little effect upon 
the disposition of property made by the will. However, when the 
ward has made a specific devise of certain property by will and the 
guardian finds it necessary to sell that property, the distribution plan 
of the will is directly affected. 
Normally, when a person prior to his death disposes of property 
which he has specifically devised in his will, that gift is adeemed: the 
will is revoked as to that particular devise.22 Likewise, when it is 
necessary for the guardian to sell certain of the ward's property be-
fore the ward's death, the fact that the property is the subject of a 
specific devise does not affect the validity of the sale. This is true 
regardless of whether the terms of the will are known to the guardian 
or court, the theory being that the only proper concern of the guard-
ian is the benefit of his ward.23 When property which is the subject 
22. In re Dungan, 31 Del. Ch. 551, 73 A.2d 776 (Super. Ct. 1950); Schildt v. Schildt, 
201 Md. 10, 92 A.2d 367 (1952); In re Robinson, 139 Neb. 707, 298 N.W. 559 (1941); 
Camden Trust Co. v. Cramer, 136 N.J. Eq. 261, 40 A.2d 601 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945); 
In re Ossont, 208 Misc. 449, 143 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Surr Ct. 1955); In re Van Duyne, 205 
Okla. 440, 239 P.2d 387 (1951); Blair v. Shannon, 349 Pa. 550, 37 A.2d 563 (1944); 
6 PAGE, WILIS § 54.5 (rev. ed. 1962). 
23. [T]he guardian of a person of unsound mind should, in the management of 
his estate, attend solely and entirely to the interests of the owner, without looking 
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of a specific devise is sold by a guardian, the courts are split on the 
treatment to be accorded the intended heir. A majority hold that 
since the ward, the incompetent, lacks the testamentary capacity to 
change the will after the specifically devised property is sold, the 
proceeds of that sale, to the extent they still exist in identifiable 
form, will be substituted for the property.24 A minority treat a spe-
cific devise as adeemed in all cases where the property cannot be 
found in the estate, on the theory that the courts have no power to 
convert a specific devise into a general devise.25 
Neither approach secures to the intended recipient of a specific 
devise the property that the testator wanted him to receive. When 
the terms of the will are unknown to the guardian and the supervis-
ing court, this is unfortunate but unavoidable. When the terms of a 
will are known, however, the guardian has at least some opportunity 
to preserve his ward's testamentary intention. Of course, if there is 
no property left in the ward's estate except property subject to a spe-
cific devise, and the ward's income is insufficient to meet his ex-
penses, the guardian has no choice but to sell the property. This is 
only proper, and it may be assumed that the ward would have done 
the same if he were competent. Normally, however, at the time it 
becomes necessary to sell a part of the incompetent's estate, property 
which is the subject of a specific devise will not be the only property 
remaining. A question then arises as to which property to sell: that 
which is the subject of a specific devise, or that which will pass 
through a general devise? A strict rule that the court should direct 
the sale of the generally devised property first will not suffice, since 
the sale of such property will reduce the size of the estate going to 
general heirs under the will. When a guardian needs to sell only a 
small portion of a large estate, and his choice of property will have 
the effect either of obliterating a small specific devise or merely re-
ducing the residuary estate, the plan of the estate will clearly be least 
upset by opting for the latter course. When the choice is between 
two relatively equal pieces of property, however, one subject to a spe-
cific devise and the other constituting the major part of the residue 
of the ward's estate, it is not at all clear which the ward would have 
preferred to sell. In such a case, it seems to be entirely proper for 
the guardian and court, since they are acting for the ward's benefit, 
to inquire into the motives which prompted the ward to draw up 
to the interest of those who, upon his death, may have eventual rights of suc-
session. 
WoERNER § 138, at 454. 
24. Lewis v. Hill, 387 Ill. 542, 56 N.E.2d 619 (1944); In re Estate of Bierstedt, 254 
Iowa 772, 119 N.W.2d 234 (1963); Walsh v. Gillespie, 338 Mass. 278, 154 N.E.2d 906 
(1959); Buder v. Stocke, 343 Mo. 506, 121 S.W.2d 852 (1938); Duncan v. Bigelow, 96 
N.H. 216, 72 A.2d 497 (1950); In re Estate of Cooper, 95 N.J. Eq. 210, 123 Atl. 245 
(Ct. Err. &: App. 1923); Bishop v. Fullmer, 112 Ohio App. 140, 175 N.E.2d 209 (1960). 
25. In re Estate of Ireland, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931); In re Barrow's Estate, 
103 Vt. 501, 156 Atl. 408 (1931). 
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his will in the way that he did. Still other factors may also require 
consideration. For example, the guardian may be faced with a choice 
between selling high income property and low income property. If 
the ward is expected to live for any great length of time, sale of the 
low income property will benefit the ward more than sale of the high 
income property, and may avoid complete exhaustion of the estate. 
If the conflict between the directions of the ward's will and his 
present personal need is called to the attention of the supervising 
court, it is likely that the court will weigh the feasibility of main-
taining the ward's testamentary purposes against the present benefit 
to the ward in deciding what property shall be sold. Apparently, no 
one acting merely to protect his interests as a prospective heir of an 
incompetent has ever successfully challenged a judge's decision that 
it was necessary to sell a particular piece of property. It is even pos-
sible that since the beneficiary named in a will is not considered to 
have an interest in the property devised until the will takes effect, 
he lacks the standing necessary to challenge such a decision. In any 
event, these questions will not often arise, since a guardian is likely 
to sell, and in some states must sell,26 personal property, which can 
be done without court approval, before seeking a court's permission 
to sell real estate. 
The most direct way for a guardian to affect his ward's testa-
mentary plans is, of course, to rewrite his ward's will. Rewriting a 
will, however, does not seem to be a necessary part of the guardian's 
role of providing for his ward's needs while alive, and court refer-
ences to the rewriting of a will by a guardian uniformly state that 
it is beyond the guardian's power.27 Such references are dictum, 
however, since there is no reported instance of a guardian attempt-
ing to rewrite a will. 
The law of guardianship has largely ignored the effects on the 
last will and testament of a ward resulting from the management 
of the ward's property. This indifference should be carefully com-
pared with the not entirely consistent treatment which some courts 
have accorded other testamentary devices of the ward. 
B. Trusts 
A modern estate plan is also likely to contain an inter vivas trust. 
Unlike in a will, a person who creates a trust retains no more rights 
in the trust than the instrument itself provides.28 Thus, if a ward 
is the settlor of a trust his guardian certainly has no more power 
26. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS .ANN. ch. 202, § 5 (1955); 1fi:. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 
§ 2051 (1954); MICH. Cm,IP. LAws § 703.17 (1948); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 3A:16-4 (Supp. 
1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 2842 (1958). 
27. See, e.g., In re Young Estate, 376 Mich. 106, 135 N.W.2d 417 (1965); Kay v. 
Erickson, 209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932). 
28. See .BOGERT, TRUSTS 8: TRUSTEES § 992 (2d ed. 1962); REsTATEMENT (SECOND), 
TRUSJ'S § 380 (1959); 3 $COTT, TRUSTS § 330 (2d ed. 1956). 
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with regard to the trust than that which the ward reserved for him-
self. It is settled that under a trust a guardian may enforce those 
of his ward's rights which are of a non-discretionary nature, such as 
a right to income.29 However, the settlor of a trust frequently re-
serves powers to revoke, amend, or invade a trust, and since these 
powers are often of a strictly discretionary nature, it is questionable 
whether a gu~rdian may exercise them. 
I. The Totten Trust 
The cases usually cited for the proposition that a guardian may 
revoke a trust deal with savings account trusts30-commonly known 
as Totten, or tentative, trusts.31 A Totten trust is created by deposit-
ing money in a savings account in the name of the depositor as 
trustee for a third person. It is usually considered not to have cre-
ated any absolute interest in the beneficiary until the depositor dies 
or takes some affirmative action in addition to opening the account.32 
Thus, the beneficiary of a Totten trust has no right to money which 
the creator-depositor withdraws from the account during his life-
time.33 Since Totten trusts are sui generis, questions as to a guar-
dian's power over Totten trust funds should be considered sepa-
rately from the problems of other trust arrangements. 
When the creator of a Totten trust becomes incompetent, his 
guardian is uniformly permitted to use the bank account funds for 
the ward's benefit.34 Some question might be raised as to the power 
of courts to permit such action, since the court supervising the guard-
ian frequently lacks jurisdiction over inter vivas trusts.35 However, 
it is arguable that since the creator could have freely used these 
funds had he remained competent, the courts, by permitting or 
ordering the guardian to use the funds, are merely authorizing the 
exercise of a power belonging to the ward.36 
The decision of a guardianship court to permit the use of money 
from a Totten trust fund is somewhat analogous to the sale of prop-
erty specifically devised by will. In both cases the property is proper-
29. Witherington v. Nickerson, 256 Mass. 351, 152 N.E. 707 (1926); REsrATEMENT 
(SECOND}, TRUSTS § 200 (1959). 
30. E.g., Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P .2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1956); In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942); Ganley v. 
Lincoln Sav. Bank, 257 App. Div. 509, 13 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1939); In re Gross, 
62 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1936); In re Derr, 83 Pa. D. &: C. 603 (C.P. 1952). 
31. The Totten trust received its name from In the Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 
Il2, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). 
32. See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS &: TRUSTEES § 47 (2d ed. 1965); REsrATEMENT 
(SECOND}, TRUSTS § 58 (1959); 1 Scorr, TRUSTS § 58 (2d ed. 1956). 
33. See In the Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). 
34. See, e.g., cases cited note 30 supra. 
35. This was true, for example, in In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 
2 N.W.2d 140 (1942). 
36. See id. But see, In re Gross, 62 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
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ty that the ward, if competent, would have been free to use had he so 
desired, but which, if not so used, would have gone to a particular 
beneficiary upon the ward's death. It is frequently said that in such 
cases the court should direct the guardian "to act ... in accordance 
with what the court finds would, in all probability, have been the 
choice of the incompetent if he had been of sound mind."37 How-
ever, in practice, the guiding test applied by the courts for determin-
ing when a guardian may use Totten trust funds seems to be the 
present need of the ward.38 The interest of the beneficiary in having 
the Totten trust fund remain untouched is usually respected by the 
court,39 but it is not sacrosanct.4° For example, in a case where there 
was a choice between the sale of valuable real estate and use of 
Totten trust funds to improve the real estate so that it would pro-
duce sufficient income to support the ward, a California appellate 
court, over the objection of the trust beneficiary, ordered the pro-
bate court to consider using the Totten trust money.41 
2. The Inter Vivos Trust 
The Totten trust is not likely to be found in a carefully worked-
out estate plan;42 instead, careful planners tend to rely more heavily 
on the traditional inter vivas trust device. When a ward has estab-
lished an inter vivas trust prior to his incompetency, his remaining 
estate will usually be sufficient to cover the expenses of a guardian-
ship. If it is not, a question arises whether the guardian may exercise 
a reserved power to invade or revoke the trust. It is clear that if the 
settlor-ward were competent and needed the money for his own 
necessities he would be free to exercise the reserved power to invade 
the trust. It should follow, as in the case of the Totten trust, that 
his guardian should also be able to exercise this power. In some 
states, moreover, it is possible to advance another line of argument 
to support invasion of the trust by the guardian. While the analogy 
is somewhat imperfect, a guardian advancing expenses or incurring 
personal debts subject to reimbursement from the ward's estate43 
87. In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 583, 2 N.W. 2d 140, 144 (1942), 
quoting In re Will of Hills, 264 N.Y. 849, 353, 191 N.E. 12, 13 (1934). 
38. See cases cited note 30 supra. 
39. See Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P.2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1956); In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942). Cf. In re 
Gross, 62 N.Y.S,2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
40. Compare In re Derr, 83 Pa. D. &: C. 603 (C.P. 1952) and Young v. Dollar Savings 
Dank, 25 Pa. D. &: C. 80 (C.P. 1938), with Guardianship of Cuen note 39 supra. 
41. Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P,2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956). 
The probate court was ordered to consider, among other things, the life expectancy 
of the ward in making its decision. Id. at 262, 298 P.2d at 547. 
42, For examples of the problems attendant upon a Totten trust, see BOGERT, TRusrs 
&: TRUSTEFS § 47 (2d ed. 1956). 
48. See text accompanying note 7 supra. 
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may be compared to a creditor of the settler of a revocable trust. 
Normally creditors of the settler cannot reach the trust property.44 
However, in some states there are statutes which permit a creditor 
to reach the trust property where a power of revocation has been 
reserved.45 In those states it might be argued that a guardian who has 
advanced his own money for necessaries is sufficiently like a creditor 
to permit him to reach the trust funds, even if he could not other-
wise exercise the settler-ward's power of revocation.46 
In most states the jurisdiction over incompetents and the juris-
diction over inter vivos trusts are vested in different courts.47 Any 
attempt by a guardian to invade a trust created by his ward would 
therefore probably require two judicial steps: the first in the guar-
dianship court and the second in the court supervising the trust. 
Assuming the guardian has the power to invade a trust created by 
his ward, a question arises as to which of the two courts should 
determine the necessity for the invasion. The guardianship court 
might make this determination, with the expectation that its decision 
would be respected by the court with jurisdiction over the trust, 
on the theory that it alone has the power to make decisions on 
behalf of its settler-ward. However, unlike Totten trusts or wills, 
beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust who are not presently entitled 
to benefits may, in some limited instances, be empowered to seek 
enforcement of the trust.48 Certainly, any beneficiary of the trust 
who had not participated in the guardianship court proceedings 
could urge the court with jurisdiction over the trust to reconsider 
the need to invade the trust. Moreover, equity courts supervising 
trusts have always asserted the power to vary the terms of a trust 
after a change in circumstances, in order to carry out the settler's 
purpose;49 the incompetency of the settler might be considered to 
be such a change of circumstance. 
44. In the absence of fraud or a statute to the contrary it has been held that the 
settlor's creditors cannot reach the trust property directly, nor can they compel the 
settlor to exercise the power of revocation. Murphey v. C.I.T. Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 33 
A.2d 16 (1943); see 3 Sco-rr, TRUSTS § 330.12 (2d ed. 1956). 
45. E.g., Ar.A. CODE tit. 47, § 75 (1958); IND. STAT. ANN. § 56-610 (Burns, 1961); 
MicH. COMP. LA.ws § 556.14 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 502.76 (1947); N.Y. REAL PROP, 
LAw § 139 (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-05-35 (1960); OKLA. STAT, tit. 60, § 267 
(1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 231.51 (1957). 
46. Cf. In re Derr, 83 Pa. D. & C. 603 (C.P. 1952). 
47. See notes 22 and 37 supra and accompanying text. 
48. The textwriters broadly assert that any beneficiary of an inter vivos trust may 
enforce the trust. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSI'EES § 963 (2d ed. 1962); R.EsTATEMENT (SEC· 
OND), TRUSTS § 172, comment c (1959); 2 Sco-rr, TRUSTS § 172 (2d ed. 1956). However, 
in many states one who is not a present beneficiary of the trust may bring an action 
for enforcement only if he alleges active mismanagement. See Note, 65 l\IICH. L. REv. 
981 (1967). Nevertheless, even the existence of this limited right might lead a trustee 
to resist invasion of a trust more vigorously. 
49. Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 255 Mich. 436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931); Bennett v. 
Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 s.w. 840 (1912); R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS 
§ 168 (1959). 
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There is apparently no reported case in which a guardian, seek-
ing to exercise the settlor-ward's power of invasion or revocation, 
has actually appeared in a court with jurisdiction over the trust. 
However, at least one case has held that a court supervising a guard-
ian may order the guardian to exercise his ward's power to invade 
a trust. In 1'.1atter of Norris,50 a resident of New York had established 
a trust in Massachusetts which by its terms reserved to the settlor a 
power of invasion. The settlor was later adjudged incompetent and 
her son was appointed as her guardian. The son petitioned a New 
York court for an order to invade the trust in the amount of $5,000, 
claiming that the money was necessary to meet the expenses of the 
settlor. The New York Supreme Court, in Special Term, while con-
ceding the power of Massachusetts to make a final determination of 
whether the power of invasion was purely personal to the settlor, 
held that since it had jurisdiction over the settlor's affairs while she 
was incompetent, "any property election of this description which 
the donor could exercise had she remained of sound mind may now 
be made on her behalf and in her interest by this court."51 The court 
ordered the son to exercise the power of invasion and bring suit in 
Massachusetts if necessary to do so. It should be noted that in New 
York the jurisdiction over mental incompetents is vested in the 
Supreme Court, 52 a court of general jurisdiction, 53 rather than in a 
court of probate jurisdiction, as in most states.54 Arguably, however, 
even if a court has jurisdiction only over an incompetent's affairs 
the reasoning of the Norris case would still seem to be applicable, 
because the court, despite its general jurisdiction, did not have juris-
diction over the trust in question. Nevertheless, in a state where 
the authority of courts of limited jurisdiction is narrowly construed 
the result might be different. 
On a subsequent appeal, the Norris case was remanded with in-
structions to determine whether an allowance being paid to the son, 
an adult, was a necessary expense of the settlor's estate.55 This in-
struction raises the question of the standards to be applied in deter-
mining whether to invade a trust. The lower court had said that it 
would "try, so far as reasonably practicable, to put itself in the posi-
tion of the donor, and to determine what she would likely have done 
or would be reasonably apt to do had she remained of sound mind."56 
The court in effect was saying that it would disturb the ward's ear-
lier plans as little as possible, since the ward had never really ex-
50. 180 Misc. 361, 41 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem. 266 App. Div. 882, 42 
N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1943). 
51. 180 Misc. at 363, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 157. 
52. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW§ 100. 
53. N.Y. CoNsr. art. VI, § 1. 
54. See note 22 supra. 
55. Matter of Norris, 266 App. Div. 882, 42 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1943~. 
56. 180 Misc. at 363, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 157. 
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pressed any intention as to what should be done under these 
circumstances. In practice, a guardian probably would not go to the 
trouble of attempting to invade a trust until other sources of income 
for the ward are exhausted. This is probably all to the good: waiting 
until other sources of income have been exhausted would probably 
least upset the settlor's estate plan, since an inter vivos trust is likely 
to contain the most important provisions of the plan. This thinking 
was implicit in the appellate court's approach to the Norris case, in 
which the court, in deciding whether it was necessary to invade the 
trust, looked first to see if the expenses of the ward's estate could 
be reduced by eliminating unnecessary expenditures. 57 
The settlor may also reserve to himself a power to amend the 
trust, which, unlike powers of invasion or revocation, may be used 
directly to change the trust's dispositive provisions. In this respect, 
amending a trust is very much like rewriting a will, and the undis-
puted assumption that a guardian cannot rewrite a will for his ward 
argues for the conclusion that a guardian may not use a power of 
amendment to change dispositive provisions of. a trust created by 
his ward. 58 On the other hand, it is arguable that the power to re-
voke or amend a trust includes within it the power to amend,59 and 
if the guardian, under court direction, may exercise a power of his 
ward to revoke or invade a trust, as discussed above, it would seem 
that he should be able to use the lesser power of amendment to 
revoke a part of the trust for his ward's present needs. 
Finally, it should be noted that a power of invasion may be given 
to a person other than the settlor of a trust. When such a power has 
been given to a beneficiary who subsequently becomes incompetent, 
it is largely a question of the settlor's intent as to whether the bene-
ficiary's guardian may exercise the power. If the settlor was relying 
upon the personal judgment of the holder of the power, then no one 
else, including a guardian or a court, should be able to exercise that 
judgment.(1° If the power of invasion has been conditioned upon a 
showing of the beneficiary's necessity, however, and by this the set-
tlor intended to secure the beneficiary's needs, it seems that a guard-
ian, upon a showing of such necessity, should be able to exercise 
that power. When a beneficiary has been given an unconditional 
power of invasion, it is possible that the settlor was relying on the 
personal judgment of the beneficiary, but it is not unreasonable that 
the settlor also intended to secure the beneficiary's needs. Thus in 
57. 266 App. Div. at 883, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (1943). 
58. See note 27 supra. 
59. The question of whether a power to amend a trust includes the power to 
revoke is basically one of interpretation of the trust instrument. See 3 Scon, TRusrs 
§ 331.2 (2d ed. 1956). 
60. See In the Mat~r of Es~te of G~nt, 122 Misc. 491, 204 N.Y. Supp. 238 (Surr. 
c~ 1924). 
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a case where all of ·a beneficiary's personal resources have been ex-
hausted it may be justifiable to permit a guardian to exercise the 
beneficiary's unconditional power of invasion. This question of 
whether the power is considered personal or not would clearly be 
in the hands of the court supervising the trust, not the guardianship 
court, since it involves a question of determining whether the pur-
pose of the trust is being carried out. 
C. Life Insurance 
Insurance may also play an important part in the planning of 
an estate, and there are a number of attributes of life insurance 
which may be important to the guardian of an incompetent. If, for 
example, the ward's insurance policy does not provide that payment 
of premiums ceases upon disability of the policyholder, the guardian 
must decide whether to continue to pay the premiums. If he decides 
not to do so, he may be faced with a number of additional options, 
such as t~king a paid-up policy with a lesser face value, or taking 
term insurance in the full face amount of the old policy. Where the 
ward, if he was competent, would have been able to elect from 
among such options upon non-payment of premiums, the guardian 
may exercise the same discretion under court direction.61 Moreover, 
a guardian may surrender the policy for its cash value, or borrow 
against the cash value of the policy without court direction, and is 
subject to liability for so doing only if he has not acted with due 
regard to his ward's interests.62 The guardian may likewise exchange 
the policy for one of less value in order to stop the accumulation of 
interest on a loan made by the insurance company to the ward before 
the ward became incompetent. 63 It should be noted that if the life 
insurance policy is part of an estate plan and payment to the bene-
ficiary is in lieu of, or in addition to, a bequest under the ward's 
will, any of the above actions by a guardian may have the same effect 
as the sale of an item which has been specifically devised under a 
will. Yet courts have given little thought to the interest of the bene-
ficiary when considering the guardian's use of life insurance funds.64 
Finally, a policyholder usually has the right to change the bene-
ficiary of a policy. Such a change has much the same effect as rewrit-
ing a will. This analogy has impressed several courts as the primary 
reason for refusing to permit a guardian, acting with or without 
61. Pendas v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 129 Fla. 253, 176 So. 104 (1938). Court 
approval may not always be necessary. See Latterman v. Guardian Life Assur. Co., 280 
N.Y. 102, 19 N.E.2d 978 (1939). See also Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1063 (1937), supplemented 
by 127 A.L.R. 454 (1940), and 136 A.L.R. 1045 (1942). 
62. Maclay v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 152 U. S. 499 (1894:). Cf. Kay v. Erickson, 
209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932). 
63. Ibid. 
6·1. See Maclay v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 152 U.S. 499 (1894); Kay v. Erickson, 
209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 (1932). 
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court direction, to change the beneficiary. 65 There is an additional 
reason given for denying the guardian this power: the role of a guar-
dian is restricted to actions taken for the present benefit of the ward, 
and the ward derives no present benefit from a change in the bene-
ficiary of a life insurance policy.66 However, at least one court has 
ordered the guardian of an incompetent to make such a change.67 
There the ward, prior to becoming incompetent, had taken out two 
policies naming his wife as beneficiary. When the ward became in-
sane, his wife had their marriage annulled, after which the guardian 
petitioned the court for an order to make the ward's estate the bene-
ficiary of the policies in place of the ex-wife. All interested parties, 
the ward, the guardian, the ex-wife, and the insurance company, 
were before the court. Relying on a statute authorizing the chancel-
lor to direct the guardian to exercise any power of the incom-
petent, 68 the court said that it would "do that which it is reasonable 
to belief the lunatic himself would do if he had the capacity to act."00 
The chancellor, after examining the ward in court, granted the guar-
dian's petition and ordered the change of beneficiary, giving several 
reasons for his decision. First, he found that the ex-wife had severed 
all connections with the ward and that he could have defeated her 
interest in the policies had he not been incompetent. Second, the 
same result could have been accomplished more directly by surren-
dering the policies for their cash value. Third, after the change the 
proceeds, when paid, would first be applied to the expenses of the 
ward's last illness and burial, and the remainder would pass intestate 
to his brothers and sister, who were caring for him. Finally, if the 
ward regained his sanity he could change the beneficiary at any time 
he wished. 
The court made no reference to the ward's present needs. This 
approach is difficult to reconcile with both the notion that the guard-
ian's role is limited to providing for his ward's present needs and 
65. E.g., In re Young Estate, 376 Mich. 106, 135 N.W.2d 417 (1965); In re Sellers, 
154 Ohio St. 483, 96 N.E.2d 595 (1951); Kay v. Erickson, 209 Wis. 147, 244 N.W. 625 
(1932). 
66. In re Young Estate, supra note 65. 
67. In re Degnan, 122 N.J. Eq. 470, 194 Atl. 789 (1937). 
68. Where any power, discretionary or otherwise, is or shall be vested in or given 
to, or the exercise of any power is or ~hall be dependent. up_on the c?nsent of. ~ny 
idiot, lunatic or person of unsound mmd, upon the application by bill or petition 
of the gnardian of any such idiot, lunatic, or peyson of unsound. mind, or of any 
person intere~ted, the_ court of chance!)' may, 1f 1t_ appears expedient so to do, by 
order authonze or duect such guardian to exerose such power or execute such 
consent in manner and form as shall be directed by said court, and any and every 
conveyance or other instrument made and executed by such guardian pursuant 
to such order, shall be as valid and effective as though duly made and executed 
by such idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind when of sound mind, memory 
and understanding. 
N.J. COMP. STATS. p. 2792, § 14j (1910). The present version of this statute has not 
been materially changed. N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:22-l (1952). 
69. In re Degnan, 122 N.J. Eq. 470, 473, 194 Atl. 789, 791 (Ch. 1937), quoting Potter 
v. Berry, 53 N.J. Eq. 151 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1895). 
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the rule that a guardian may not directly change a dispositive plan. 
The court's primary reason for changing the beneficiary was that, 
under the circumstances, the ward could no longer reasonably desire 
that his ex-wife remain the object of his bounty.70 It is difficult to 
see why this reasoning would not permit a court to order a change 
in an incompetent's will or trust if the ward's desires were sufficiently 
apparent or inferable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The duty of a guardian is to provide for his ward's needs and 
conserve his ward's estate. Normally, conscientious fulfillment of 
this duty will serve the interest of both the incompetent and his 
prospective heirs, since the heirs are also interested in retaining as 
large an estate as possible. Frequently, however, medical bills or the 
expenses of institutional care for the aging incompetent may require 
the guardian to dip heavily into his ward's estate. Several factors 
will determine which property the guardian may choose to sell first. 
Since the guardian has the duty to produce income,71 high income 
property is unlikely to be sold first. He is also unlikely to sell prop-
erty, such as real estate, for which he must go to the trouble of 
obtaining court approval. Moreover, if the guardian happens to be 
the beneficiary of the ward's life insurance policy, or if he is in line 
to receive particular property under the ward's will, he will not be 
inclined to cash in the insurance or sell such property first. If the 
guardian finds it necessary either to sell real estate or to invade a 
trust, both of which require court approval, the sale of real estate 
would probably be the most convenient choice administratively, in 
view of the uncertainty of the law surrounding the invasion of a 
trust. Thus, using administrative convenience as the standard, a 
rough order of priority for the liquidation of an incompetent's 
estate may be established as follows: first, personal property, second, 
life insurance funds, third, real estate, and finally, trust funds. It 
should be readily apparent that any correspondence between admin-
istrative convenience in selling property and the desires of the ward, 
as expressed in his estate plans, is purely fortuitous. 
A supervising court is likely to consider the ward's estate plans, 
if it knows about them. However, since the guardian has no duty 
to take his ward's estate plans into consideration,72 he may have 
already upset these plans before the problem ever reaches a court. 
As the law presently stands, the priorities of liquidation may in 
practice give preferential treatment to certain types of estate arrange-
'70. In re Degnan, 122 N.J. Eq. 4'70, 4'73-'74, 194 Atl. '789, '791 (Ch. 1937). 
'71. See authorities cited note 12 supra. 
'72. WOERNER § 138, at 454. 
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ments.73 For example, it is much more difficult for the guardian to 
make use of property which would pass to the beneficiaries of a trust 
than property which would pass by will or life insurance. Similarly, 
the interest of general legatees under a ward's will is not as likely 
to be consumed completely by a guardianship as is the interest of a 
person who is to receive specific property under the terms of the will. 
Guardians and the courts which supervise them are supposed to 
act in the best interests of their wards. In practice, they act merely 
to provide for their wards' immediate needs, without regard to 
longer range considerations. In the case of a minor this is probably 
sufficient, but one of the greatest present concerns to an aged ward 
is what will happen to his property when he dies. There is no reason 
under present law for a judge not to review, either on his own initia-
tive or at the request of a prospective heir or the guardian, the 
condition of the ward's assets and the nature of his estate plan in 
order to set guidelines for the administration of the estate which 
would be responsive to both the present interests of the ward and 
the longer range requirements of his estate plan. 
A recent case illustrates what a forward-looking court may accom-
plish in promoting both the present interests of the ward and the 
interests of his prospective heirs. Under the doctrine of substituted 
judgment some courts have recognized that distributions out of sur-
plus income may, in proper circumstances, be made to needy rela-
tives.74 In such a case, the court purports to act as it is probable the 
ward would have acted if he were of sound mind.75 In a recent 
decision of the California District Court of Appeals, Guardianship 
of Christiansen,16 this doctrine was broadened to permit distribution 
of a part of the principle to prospective heirs of the incompetent 
for the purpose of avoiding estate taxes. The court in Christiansen 
rejected the probate court's argument that the limited statutory 
authorization for the doctrine of substituted judgment77 precluded 
a probate court from making such a distribution. Instead, the appel-
late court read two prior decisions of the California Supreme Court 
to mean that the statutory powers of the probate court merely sup-
plement its inherent equity powers in the administration of an 
73. See Guardianship of Cuen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 258, 298 P.2d 545 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1956); In re Guardianship of Overpeck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.W.2d 140 (1942); Ganley v. 
Lincoln Sav • .Bank, 257 App. Div. 509, 13 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App. Div. 1939); Matter of 
Norris, 180 Misc. 361, 41 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff d mem., 266 App. Div. 882, 
42 N.Y.S.2d 804 (App. Div. 1943); In re Gross, 62 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1936); In re 
Derr, 83 Pa. D. 8: C. 603 (C.P. 1952). 
74. This doctrine was enunciated by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Merivale 
99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816). For cases in which it has been used, see, e.g., In re 
Johnson, 111 N.J. Eq. 268, 162 Atl. 96 (Ch. 1932); Matter of Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415, 162 
N.E. 471 (1928). 
75. Guardianship of Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P,2d 805 (1941). 
76. 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
77. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1558. 
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incompetent's estate.78 The court also found a trend in other juris-
dictions toward permitting payments out of principle to needy rela-
tives, provided adequate provision had already been made for the 
ward.70 The court said that in determining whether payments out 
of principle should be made, "the guardian should be authorized to 
act as a reasonable and prudent man would act under the same cir-
cumstances, unless there is evidence of any settled intention of the 
incompetent, formed while sane, to the contrary."89 Rejecting the 
argument that it could not act for the benefit of prospective heirs, 
the court went on to say the following: 
To refuse to permit the management of the incompetent's estate in 
the manner that a reasonable and prudent man would manage his 
estate may, in many cases, lead to the improbable conclusion that it 
was the intent of the incompetent to enrich the taxing authorities 
rather than the natural or declared objects of his bounty.81 
Concluding that a reasonable man in planning his estate might make 
gifts in order to avoid unnecessary estate or inheritance taxes or 
expenses of administration, the court remanded the case to the pro-
bate court, listing four points that should be considered in deter-
mining whether to authorize the payments to prospective heirs. 
The first point is that when the incompetent's condition is not 
permanent, payments are justifiable only as a continuation of the 
ward's practices or plans prior to incompetency.82 The second point 
is that the distribution of principle should be permitted only to the 
extent that the remaining sum will produce sufficient income to 
meet the ward's probable maximum expenses.83 The third is that 
the gifts should conform, as nearly as possible, to the devolution of 
property which would take place, either by will or intestacy, upon 
the incompetent's death, although the prospective heirs might, by 
waiver, vary this order.84 Finally, the California court required some 
showing of the kind of relationship and intimacy which would have 
made the prospective donees the object of the ward's bounty had 
the ward been competent.85 
A foresighted estate planner could avoid the problems of a guard-
ianship by laying plans against possible incompetency which elimi-
nate altogether the need to appoint a guardian. For example, when 
78. Guardianship of Hall, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947); Harris v. Harris, 
57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481 (1962). 
79. In re DuPont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1963); In re Guardianship of 
Brice, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943); In re Fleming's Estate, 173 Misc. 851, 19 
N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940); In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
80. 56 Cal. Rptr. at 521. 
81. Id. at 522. 
82. Id. at 523. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Id. at 524. 
85. Ibid. 
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an inter vivas trust is established, special instructions to be followed 
by the trustee in case the settlor becomes incompetent could very 
easily eliminate entirely the need for a guardian of the settlor's 
estate. A trustee, with his more flexible powers, 86 would be able to 
administer the assets under his control for the settlor's benefit much 
more efficiently than a guardian. Unfortunately, most persons do 
not plan for incompetency, and in many states the only recourse is 
to a guardianship, with its restricted powers. Long overdue legisla-
tive action clarifying the powers of guardians and making guardians 
more flexible may perhaps be the answer to many of the problems 
raised herein. 87 
George T. Stevenson 
86. See text accompanying notes 7, 13, and 21 supra. 
87. For a discussion of guardianship provisions of the proposed Uniform Probate 
Code, see Fratcher, Toward Uniform Guardianship Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 983 
(1966). 
